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Abstract
The article examines the mandatory requirement under state corporate
law and stock exchange listing standards that public corporations hold
annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. Specifically, I
question the value of requiring corporations to (1) elect directors annually,
and (2) hold shareholders’ meetings annually. I critique the various
justifications for these requirements and find none of them persuasive. I
then explore a different approach taken by Minnesota with respect to the
frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings and conclude
that the approach is superior to the current scheme. Recognizing, however,
that any less strict state approach is overridden by exchange listing
standards requiring annual elections and meetings, I propose that these
listing standards be abolished. This would give effect to the Minnesota
approach, but more importantly, it would allow state “laboratories” to
experiment with alternative rules with respect to the frequency of elections
and meetings.
Consequently, it would add another variable for
consideration in connection with the various proposed corporate
governance reforms (e.g., shareholder proxy access, proxy contest
reimbursement, majority voting) under debate, some of which may impact
the propriety of annual director elections and shareholders’ meetings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund submitted
a shareholder proposal to the J.C. Penney Company requesting that the
company’s board of directors take the necessary steps to provide for the
election of directors once every three years instead of J.C. Penney’s
existing practice of annual director elections.1 The fund reasoned that
triennial director elections would better allow the board and senior
management to focus on the long-term which would “best serve the
interests of [J.C. Penney’s] shareholders and other important constituents.”2
The fund’s proposal seems like a sensible suggestion for addressing
concerns that various market factors cause management to focus on shortterm wealth maximization to the detriment of the corporation’s long-term
success.3 However, the proposal was never put to a vote of the
shareholders or otherwise acted upon. The fund withdrew it in the face of a
legal opinion from J.C. Penney counsel asserting that the proposal could not
be validly implemented under Delaware law (J.C. Penney’s state of
incorporation) and a letter from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
(the exchange on which J.C. Penney’s shares are listed) stating that triennial
elections would violate NYSE listing standards.4 Delaware, like most
states, requires shareholders to elect directors annually. Similarly, the
listing standards of the NYSE, as well as those of Nasdaq and the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), require that listed corporations hold annual
shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors.5
Obviously, triennial elections do not meet these requirements, and
hence the merits of the fund’s proposal were never reached nor do I reach
them in this article. Instead, I examine the mandatory requirement under
state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards that public
1

See J.C. Penney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 348374 at *1.
Id. at *4.
3
See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L.
Rev. 137, 179 (1991) (noting that “[a]lthough not all observers agree, many have suggested
that corporate managers’ obsession with short-term shareholder wealth maximization has, in
many cases, diverted their attention away from the efficient operation of their companies.”);
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 210 (1991) (asserting that “[t]he
focus on the short term has come at the expense of the long-term planning, investment and
business development of the corporation.”).
4
See J.C. Penney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 348374 at *5 & *9.
5
See NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 302.00; NASD Manual § 4350(e); Amex Company
Guide, § 704.
2
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corporations hold annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of
directors. Specifically, I question the value of requiring corporations to (1)
elect directors annually, and (2) hold shareholders’ meetings annually.
Although the origin of annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of
directors can be traced back to the twelfth century,6 surprisingly little has
been written on theses issues. Indeed, the 1996 Delaware Chancery Court
opinion in Hoschett v. TSI International Software, Ltd.7 is the only U.S.
authority directly on point. Hoschett maintains that the purpose of
requiring annual director elections is to provide a check on management
and an opportunity for the exercise of corporate democracy.8 Hoschett
posits that the purpose of requiring annual shareholders’ meetings is to
provide an opportunity for deliberation and an occasion for shareholders “to
bring matters before the shareholder body.”9 Others have suggested that an
additional purpose for requiring annual meetings is to give shareholders a
chance to confront management.
While in the aggregate these justifications may support the concept of
shareholders electing directors through the mechanism of a meeting, I argue
that they do not support requiring director elections or shareholders’
meetings annually. In fact, two states have done away with the annual
requirement. Annual director elections and shareholders’ meetings are now
optional under Minnesota and North Dakota corporate law. For exchange
listed corporations, however, relaxed state rules on these points are
essentially irrelevant. Even if an exchange listed corporation were
incorporated in Minnesota or North Dakota, it would still have to hold
annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors as required by
exchange listing standards. Hence, I propose that these listing standards be
abolished. This would give effect to the approaches taken by Minnesota
and North Dakota, but, more importantly, it would allow state
“laboratories” to experiment with alternative rules with respect to the
frequency of elections and meetings. Consequently, it would add another
variable for consideration in connection with the various proposed
corporate governance reforms (e.g., shareholder proxy access, proxy contest
reimbursement, majority voting) under debate, some of which may impact
the propriety of annual elections and meetings.

6

See Cyril O’Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, 26 BULL. OF THE BUS. HIST.
SOC’Y 55, 57 (1952).
7
683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996).
8
See id. at 45-46.
9
See id.
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The article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on state
law, exchange listing standards, and federal regulations relevant to annual
director elections and shareholders’ meetings of public corporations. Part
III critiques the various justifications for requiring director elections and
shareholders’ meetings annually and finds none of them persuasive. Part
IV explores Minnesota’s approach, weighs its benefits and costs, and
concludes that the approach is superior to the current scheme. Hence, Part
V proposes abolishing the exchanges’ annual director elections and
shareholders’ meeting requirements in order to fully expose the issue to
corporate federalism. Part VI states a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
State law generally requires corporations to hold annual shareholders’
meetings, the principal purpose of which is to elect directors.10 Likewise,
exchange listing standards require listed corporations to hold annual
shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. Finally, federal proxy
rules dictate procedures for the solicitation of proxies, a critical component
of director elections, and prescribe the form and content of the solicitation
package. Hence, annual director elections and shareholders’ meetings
implicate three separate sets of regulations, each of which is described
briefly below.
A. State Law
The corporate law of all but two states requires corporations to hold
annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors.11 Typically,
under a corporation’s bylaws, details of the meeting such as location, date,
record date, time, and agenda, are left to the board to determine.12 Any
proper business, in addition to the election of directors, may be transacted at
an annual meeting.13 This commonly includes auditor ratification and
10

See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 7.01 official cmt. (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter MBCA ANN.].
11
See, e.g., id. §§ 7.01(a) (“[a] corporation shall hold annually at a time stated in or
fixed in accordance with the bylaws a meeting of shareholders.”) and 8.01(c) (“Directors are
elected at the first annual shareholders’ meeting and at each meeting thereafter . . . .”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for
the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in
the bylaws.”).
12
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, §§ 7.01 & 7.07; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ _. See
also See D. Craig Nordlund, Planning and Conducting the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting, in
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2005 971, 991 (2005).
13
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b).
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approval of stock option plans. The corporation is required to provide
written notice of the meeting to each shareholder entitled to vote as of the
record date.14 Generally, each share of common stock is entitled to one
vote.15
For a shareholder vote at an annual meeting to be valid, a quorum must
be present at the meeting, either in person or by proxy.16 A proxy is a
person appointed by shareholders to vote their shares at the meeting on their
behalf and in accordance with their instructions.17 Generally, a majority of
shares entitled to vote constitutes a quorum.18 Most public corporations
elect directors through straight as opposed to cumulative voting and a
plurality as opposed to a majority voting standard.19 Under straight voting,
each shareholder casts the number of shares he or she owns for a nominee
for each board seat up for election. Under a plurality standard, the
nominees that receive the largest number of votes win, up to the number of
board seats up for election, regardless of whether any of them receive a
majority of votes cast.20 For example, if there were seven board seats up
for election and ten nominees running, the top seven vote getters would be
elected.
B. Exchange Listing Standards
To list securities with the NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX, a corporation
must comply with the applicable listing standards established by the
exchange.21 These standards are imposed on a corporation pursuant to a
14
See id. § 222. See also Bryan v. Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 35 A.2d 909, 913 (Del.
Ch. 1944).
15
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 7.21(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a). A
corporation can vary the voting rights of common shares in its articles or certificate of
incorporation.
16
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216.
17
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 7.22(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b).
18
See id.
19
See 2 MBCA ANN., § 7.28(a) (“Unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to
vote in the election at a meeting at which a quorum is present.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
216(3) (“Directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person
or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors”).
20
See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 7.28(a); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 216(3). See also 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 7.28 at 7-186 through 7-187
(Official Comment) (“A ‘plurality’ means that the individuals with the largest number of
votes are elected as directors up to the maximum number of directors to be chosen at the
election.”).
21
See Special Study Group of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Special Study on Market Structure,
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contract between it and the exchange and therefore are not technically a part
of federal or state law.22 However, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) does require that any listing standard rules be approved by
the SEC,23 and the SEC can also abrogate, add to or delete from any such
rules.24 Additionally, the SEC has from time to time encouraged exchanges
to voluntarily adopt certain corporate governance listing standards.25
Given that most U.S. public companies list on one of these exchanges,
listing standards have an important and substantial impact on public
corporations.26
These standards are designed to increase investor
confidence in listed companies and the exchanges and have been vaunted as
“a bastion of shareholder protection.”27
Listing standards are comprised of both quantitative and corporate
governance standards. Quantitative standards focus on financial criteria
such as public float, market capitalization, revenues, cash flow and
earnings.28 Among the corporate governance standards of each exchange is
the requirement that listed corporations hold annual shareholders’ meetings
for the election of directors.29 Other corporate governance listing standards
include specific requirements with respect to independent directors, audit
Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1489-90 (2002)
[hereinafter ABA Study].
22
See id. at 1503. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does require that any listing
standard rules be approved by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(s)(b). And the SEC can also
abrogate, add to or delete from any such rules. See id. § 78(s)(c). Additionally, the SEC has
from time to time encouraged exchanges to voluntarily adopt certain corporate governance
listing standards. This has been referred to as “regulation by raised eyebrow.” See ABA
Study, supra note --, at 1503.
23
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(s)(b)
24
25

See id. § 78(s)(c).

This has been referred to as “regulation by raised eyebrow.” See ABA Study, supra
note --, at 1503.
26
See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements,
54 SMU L. REV. 325, 325 (2001).
27
Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1477 (1992). See also ABA Study,
supra note --, at 1496-97.
28
See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 102.01.
29
Note that only the AMEX annual meeting listing standard specifically requires
directors to be elected at the meeting. The analogous NYSE and Nasdaq standards simply
require corporations to hold annual meetings but do not specify that directors are to be
elected at the meetings. The NYSE has stated on several occasions, however, that its annual
meeting requirement “is not simply a device to provide information to shareholders” but
mandates the annual election of directors. See SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 14160 at
*4. See also SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 348374 at *5. Presumably, Nasdaq would
take a similar position.

2006]

ANNUAL ELECTIONS AND MEETINGS

7

and nominating committees, and shareholder voting.30 Additionally, the
NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards require listed corporations to solicit
proxies for all shareholders’ meetings.31
C. Federal Proxy Rules
As noted above, generally a majority of a corporation’s shares must be
present in person or by proxy to satisfy the state law quorum requirement
for a valid shareholders’ meeting. For most shareholders physical
attendance at a shareholders’ meeting is an inefficient use of time—either
the site is geographically inconvenient, the shareholder’s investment in the
corporation represents a small percentage of a diversified portfolio, or
both.32 Hence, quorum requirements necessitate (and the NYSE and
Nasdaq require) that public corporations solicit shareholder proxies for their
annual meetings.33 As a result, the overwhelming majority of shareholders
vote by proxy pursuant to the proxy materials furnished to them by the
corporation, and hence, these proxy materials are of central importance to
shareholder voting.34
Appreciating this importance, Congress empowered the SEC through
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act to regulate the solicitation of proxies by
public corporations.35 The purpose of Section 14(a) “is to prevent
30

See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 301.00.
See id. § 402.04; Amex Company Guide § 7.05; NASD Manual § 4350(g).
32
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 98 (1976). See
also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 86 (The Macmillian Company 1940) (1932). As for who actually attends
meetings:
31

Analysts and the business press attend only out of a sense of duty;
sophisticated shareholders don’t go at all. The audience is likely to be
company employees and retirees looking to fill an otherwise quiet
afternoon. At some annual meetings, the audience is made up almost
exclusively of corporate executives, lawyers, p.r. people, auditors and
the like. In effect, the stagehands have become the audience.
Philip R. Lochner & Richard H. Koppes, Stop Us Before We Meet Again, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 1994, at A10.
33
See Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder
Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 507 (1994).
34
See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 6-C-1 (2004).
35
Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules

2006]

ANNUAL ELECTIONS AND MEETINGS

8

management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by
means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.”36 Thus,
rules promulgated by the SEC require a public corporation to furnish its
shareholders a detailed disclosure document called a proxy statement
whenever it solicits proxies.37 The proxy statement is designed to provide
shareholders with relevant information with respect to the matters up for
vote for which proxies are solicited.38 Therefore, a proxy statement relating
to the election of directors must include biographical information about the
nominees, when they first became directors, their stock and option holdings
in the corporation, and, with respect to incumbent directors, whether they
failed to attend at least 75 percent of board and applicable committee
meetings.39 The proxy statement must also include detailed information
about director compensation and transactions between any directors and the
corporation during the past year.40
SEC proxy regulations also specify requirements for the proxy card, the
legal document pursuant to which a shareholder appoints the proxy to vote
shares on the shareholder’s behalf.41 The card resembles an absentee ballot
in that it lists the nominees for election to the board and includes check-off
boxes for granting authority to the proxy to vote the shareholder’s shares in
favor of each candidate. Consequently, voting by proxy entails little more
than checking boxes on the card, signing it and dropping it in the mail.
Among other things, SEC regulations require that the card set forth the
name of the proxy and on whose behalf proxy appointments are solicited.42
SEC regulations also prohibit a proxy card from conferring authority to
vote for a nominee not listed in the proxy statement or to vote at more than
one annual meeting.43

and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security [issued by a public corporation].
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
36
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
37
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a).
38
See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 366 (1986).
39
See Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2005).
40
See id., Items 7 & 8; see also 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW
HANDBOOK § 17:6 at 969 (2005).
41
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4.
42
See id. § 240.14a-4(a)(1).
43
Id. § 240.14a-4(d).
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Additionally, if a proxy solicitation for the election of directors at an
annual meeting is made by the corporation’s management, the solicitation
materials must be accompanied or preceded by an annual report to security
holders.44 As required by SEC regulations, the annual report provides
detailed information about the corporation’s performance, including audited
year-end financial statements. Hence, it furnishes shareholders with a
means to evaluate the corporation’s performance under the stewardship of
the incumbent board.
In a different vein, federal proxy rules require a public corporation to
include in its proxy materials shareholder proposals meeting certain
qualifications discussed below.45 Common examples include proposals to
repeal staggered boards, eliminate supermajority voting provisions, and
rescind poison pills.46 Shareholder proposals also frequently address social
issues such as the inhumane treatment of animals.47
A corporation is only required to include those proposals that meet
various procedural and substantive requirements specified in Rule 14a-8.
To be eligible to submit a proposal, the proponent must have continually
held at least $2,000 or 1% of the corporation’ stock during the preceding
year.48 The length of the proposal is limited to 500 words and for annual
meetings generally must be submitted at least four months prior to the
anniversary of the mailing date of the previous year’s proxy materials.49
The rule provides thirteen substantive grounds under which a
corporation may exclude a proposal from its proxy materials.50 For
example, a corporation can exclude a proposal that is not a proper subject
for action by shareholders under state corporate law, relates to ordinary
business operations, relates to the election of directors, or has already been
substantially implemented by the corporation.51 If a corporation intends to
exclude a proposal, it must file a no-action letter request with the SEC
explaining why the corporation believes the proposal is excludable.52 The
SEC will either grant or deny the request, and the corporation will generally
44

See id. § 240.14a-3(b).
See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
46
See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABOCH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK § 5:2
(2005).
47
See 1 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note --, § 18:1 at 398.
48
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
49
See id. § 240.14a-8(d) & (e)(1).
50
See id. § 240.14a-8(i).
51
See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1), (7), (8 & (10).
52
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j).
45
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include or exclude the proposal in conformance with the SEC’s decision.53
Infrequently, a proponent of a proposal that the corporation and the SEC
deem excludable will thereafter seek a court order compelling the
corporation to include the proposal.54
III. JUSTIFICATIONS
As a result of state corporate laws and exchange listing standards,
public corporations are required to elect directors and hold shareholders’
meetings annually. As mentioned above, the 1996 Delaware Chancery
Court opinion in Hoschett v. TSI International Software, Ltd. 55 sets forth
various justifications for these requirements. This part briefly describes the
facts of Hoschett and then explores the justifications. It also discusses an
additional justification for the annual meeting requirement not mentioned in
Hoschett. Finally, finding none of the justifications persuasive, it briefly
explores why the annual director elections and shareholders’ meeting
requirements emerged.
A. The Facts of Hoschett v. TSI International Software, Ltd.
Hoschett involved a suit against TSI International Software, Ltd., a
privately-held Delaware corporation, brought by Fred Hoschett, a TSI
shareholder. The suit sought an order compelling TSI to hold an annual
meeting for the election of directors as required by Delaware General
Corporation Law (Delaware Code) Section 211.56 TSI had never held an
annual meeting for the election of directors during its several years of
existence.57 As a result, Hoschett moved for summary judgment under
Delaware Code Section 211(c) which provides that the Court of Chancery
may summarily order a meeting upon application of any shareholder if one
has not been held for a period of 13 months.58 TSI responded with its own
motion for summary judgment asserting it had fulfilled Section 211’s
annual meeting requirement by electing directors through shareholder
written consent in lieu of a meeting in accordance with Delaware Code
Section 228(a).59

53

See 1 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note --, § 18:7 at 995.
See id. See also Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed
Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 881 (1994).
55
683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996).
56
See id. at 43.
57
See id. at 44.
58
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c).
59
See Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 44. Delaware Code Section 228(a) provides as follows:
54
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Thus, the court had to reconcile the mandatory annual meeting
language of Delaware Code Section 211(b) with Section 228(a) which
allows any required shareholder action to be taken without a meeting
through shareholder written consent. Noting that the annual meeting
requirement is one of the few mandatory provisions of Delaware corporate
law and that “Delaware courts have long recognized the central role of
annual meetings in the scheme of corporate governance,”60 the court
concluded that the annual meeting requirement in Section 211(b) trumped
Section 228(a) and thus could not be fulfilled by shareholder written
consent.61 In reaching its conclusion, the court addressed both why
corporations are required to elect directors annually and why corporations
are required to hold shareholders’ meetings annually.
B. Annual Director Election Requirement
1. Check on Management
Providing a check on management is perhaps the most obvious
justification for mandatory annual director elections. A central theme of
corporate law is addressing the agency problem inherent in the separation
of ownership from control. The typical public corporation is collectively
“owned” by numerous and dispersed shareholders but controlled by
management.62 Because management generally owns only a small
percentage of the corporation’s stock but has a large human capital
investment in the corporation, the interests of management and shareholders

Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, any action
required by this chapter to be taken at any annual or special meeting of
stockholders of a corporation, or any action which may be taken at any
annual or special meeting of such stockholders, may be taken without a
meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or consents
in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the
holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number
of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a
meeting at which all shares entitled to vote thereon were present.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a).
60
Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 44.
61
See id.
62
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note --, at 3; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1-2 (1993). Note that “owned” is in quotes because
shareholders do not own the corporation is the traditional sense of the word. Instead they
own the residual claim to the corporation’s income and assets.

2006]

ANNUAL ELECTIONS AND MEETINGS

12

diverge.63 As a result, management may take action in its own best interest
as opposed to the best interest of the shareholders.64 Management may, for
example, allocate itself excessive compensation or other perquisites, engage
in empire building, or shirk responsibility.65
To address this agency problem, the board of directors is charged with
monitoring senior executives.66
However, the board may become
dominated by, or beholden to, the executive team and therefore shirk its
monitoring responsibility.67 Thus, annual director elections, at least in
theory, provide shareholders with the ability to oust an ineffective board
which thereby provides a check on management. As Chancellor Allen put
it in Hoschett, “[t]he annual election of directors is a structured occasion
that necessarily focuses attention on corporate performance. Knowing that
such an occasion is necessarily to be faced annually may itself have a
marginally beneficial effect on managerial attention and performance.”68
Emphasis, however, should be placed on “marginally beneficial” because
annual director elections provide at most a minimal check on management.
The reality is that the outcome of the vast majority of director elections
is a foregone conclusion. This is because the board controls the size and
composition of the slate of director nominees put to the shareholders for the
vote. Consequently, it sets the slate size at the number of seats up for
election and, absent a death or resignation, simply re-nominates incumbent
directors.69 Management then employs the “proxy machinery” to ensure
63
See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 566 (2006); See ROMANO, supra note --, at 2.
64
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, _ (1976); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 10
(1991).
65
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note --, at _; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --,
at 10.
66
See ROMANO, supra note --, at 2.
67
See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of
Directors and Strategic Control: Effects of Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72,
72-73 (1990) (noting that “managers dominate their boards by using their de facto power to
select and compensate directors and by exploiting personal ties with them.”).
68
Id. at 44-45. See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards a True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1777 (2006) (“The right to elect directors is an important tool for
stockholders, allowing them to hold centralized management accountable and thereby
contributing to the creation of stockholder wealth by checking agency costs.”).
69
See Jay Cai et al., “Electing Directors” (June 2006) at 3 (noting that 1748 out of 1750
of sampled director elections had a slate size equal to the number of seats up for election).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=910548.
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their election.70 Specifically, management uses corporate funds, personnel,
and facilities to prepare, print and distribute proxy materials.71 The
materials list only the incumbent board’s slate as up for election and a
management selected individual (typically the CEO or other senior
executive) as the proxy. Additionally, the proxy statement and proxy card
specifically state that the board of directors recommends that shareholders
vote for each candidate.72
In order to empower the management selected proxy to vote the
shareholder’s shares at the annual meeting, a shareholder merely needs to
mark the “For All” box to the right of the list of nominees, date, sign and
mail the card. There is no state law, federal law, or exchange listing
standard requirement that the proxy card include an “against” box. Nor is
there a requirement to allow shareholders to write-in candidates.73 Thus,
few corporations provide these options, and therefore it is generally not
possible for a shareholder to use the corporation’s proxy card to instruct the
proxy to vote against a nominee or to vote for someone other than a
70

Berle and Means described voting by proxy and the “proxy machinery” as follows:
Designed probably as a convenience to the absent shareholder, [the
proxy] was a century ago denies to the shareholder save where by
special provision it was inserted, but its convenience speedily led to the
inclusion of this right in every charter or in the appropriate section of the
incorporation act. The growth of the corporations, the dispersion of
shareholders, the manifest impossibility for the vast majority of
shareholders to attend meetings, have made the right to vote, in reality, a
right to delegate the voting power to someone else—and the proxy is
almost invariably a dummy chosen either by the management, by the
“control,” or by a committee seeking to assume control. The proxy
machinery has thus become one of the principal instruments not by
which a stockholder exercises power over management of the enterprise,
but by which his power is separated from him.

BERLE & MEANS, supra note --, at 139.
71
See EISENBERG, supra note --, at 98.
72
For a sample proxy statement see
http://www.pg.com/content/pdf/02_investor/financial_reports/proxy/pg2005_proxy_stateme
nt.pdf. For a sample proxy card see
http://www.pg.com/content/pdf/02_investor/financial_reports/proxy/pg2005_proxy_ballot.p
df.
73
The proxy card for Intel Corporation’s 2006 annual shareholders’ meeting did
include an “against” box. This is because Intel has adopted a majority of votes cast standard
for the election of directors, so the against box was added to allow shareholders to cast a
vote against. See Intel Corporation, 2006 Proxy Statement 4 (Mar. 28, 2006). Safeway
Inc.’s proxy card for its 2006 annual shareholders’ meeting also included an “against” box
for the same reason. See Safeway Inc., 2006 Proxy Statement 2 (Apr. 12, 2006).
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nominee listed on the card. Note that SEC regulations do require the card
to also contain a box the shareholder can check to withhold authority to
vote for any nominees and a means by which a shareholder can grant
authority to vote for some nominees and withhold authority to vote for
some nominees.74
From the corporation’s perspective, it does not even matter if a
shareholder fails to mark any of the boxes on the proxy card. As allowed
by SEC regulations, management specifies on the card that if no boxes are
marked, the card will be considered as conferring power on the proxy to
vote “for” the election of each nominee.75 Further, the board’s slate will be
elected (assuming a quorum) regardless of whether the shareholders grant
or withhold authority. This is because, as noted above, the voting standard
for the election of directors at most corporations is plurality, and under a
plurality standard, the candidates that receive the largest number of votes
win.76 In an uncontested election, the only individuals who receive any
votes are those listed on the corporation’s proxy card and ballot. Since the
number of names listed will equal the number of seats up for election, each
listed person is guaranteed to be among the top (and only) vote getters and
therefore guaranteed to be elected.
Even if all non-management shareholders check the “withhold
authority” box on the proxy card or abstain from voting at the annual
meeting, management will vote the shares it controls in favor of the slate,
and the slate will still be elected, even if management votes only a single
share. The “vote no” campaigns launched from time to time by activist
shareholders—campaigns encouraging shareholders to check the “withhold
authority” box—are merely symbolic. They are used to send a message to
the board but have no impact on the outcome of an uncontested election.77
To be sure, a disgruntled shareholder (commonly referred to as an
insurgent) can nominate additional candidates or an entire alternative slate.
The corporation, however, has no obligation to include the insurgent’s
nominees on the corporation’s proxy card. An insurgent can nonetheless
74

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b).
Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(1).
76
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
77
See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Criticism Mounting as Disney’s Leader Faces Crucial
Vote, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A1 (describing vote-no campaign against Disney
director Michael Eisner), and Laura M. Holson, Defied in Vote, Disney Leader Loses One
Post, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1 (noting that Eisner re-elected as director
notwithstanding unprecedented success of vote-no campaign). In this particular campaign,
the message was heard—Eisner was stripped of his chairman position.
75
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launch a proxy contest whereby it independently solicits proxies from the
corporation’s shareholder. In such an event, shareholders would receive
two sets of proxy materials—one set from the corporation and one set from
the insurgent, thereby giving shareholders a choice of competing slates.
However, proxy contests for the election of directors outside of the takeover
context are extremely rare. During the period 1996-2004, insurgents
launched proxy contests to install rival slates outside of the takeover
context at only 108 companies, an average of 12 a year.78
Several reasons have been put forth for the dearth of electoral proxy
contests.79 The first is cost. A proxy contest will typically run an insurgent
from $5 million to $10 million.80 While the board will use the corporate
coffers to fund its proxy campaign, including fending off any insurgent
challenge, an insurgent must fund its campaign out of its own pocket and
will be reimbursed by the corporation only if it wins.81 The tab is so high
because the insurgent will not only have to prepare and mail proxy
materials, but, as discussed below, will have to overcome shareholder
apathy and other impediments. As a result, the insurgent will find it
necessary to retain attorneys, investment bankers, public relations advisors,
proxy solicitors, and financial printers.82 The fees of these professionals
quickly add up. And an incumbent board does not sit idly by in the face of
a proxy contest. It may initiate litigation against the insurgent alleging

78

See Lucian A. Bebchuk, “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” (October 2005) at
10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804. Most of these 108 companies were
small. Only 17 had market capitalizations at the time of the proxy fight exceeding $200
million , and 59 had market capitalizations at the time of the time of the proxy fight of $50
million or less. See Id.
79
See generally Bebchuk, supra note --, at 13-22.
80
See Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note --, at 511. See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN
C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 179 (2000). Note that the successful
consent solicitation undertaken by the insurgent Red Zone LLC in the fall of 2005 to oust
three of Six Flags, Inc.’s six directors cost Red Zone $11.6 million. The biggest single
expense was $5 million signing bonus to get a seasoned executive to join the insurgent slate
adding credibility. Other expenses included $813,000 in legal fees; $2.4 million in
investment banking fees; $972,000 in travel expenses incurred to meet with stockholders
during the solicitation period, $36,000 for the cost of preparing, printing and mailing proxy
materials and subsequent communications to stockholders; and $580,935 in fees and
expenses for professional proxy solicitors. See Six Flags Inc. Proxy Statement for Annual
Meeting of Stockholders to be held on May 25, 2006 at 29-30 [hereinafter Six Flags 2006
Proxy Statement].
81
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1992).
82
See Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note --, at 511; See Bebchuk, supra note --, at 14-15.
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federal proxy rule violations.83 At the same time, the insurgent may have to
initiate litigation against the corporation or inspector of elections to, for
example, obtain access to corporate records or challenge the invalidation of
proxy cards. Any such litigation will add to the insurgent’s costs.84
Although an insurgent’s costs will likely be reimbursed by the
corporation if it prevails, only 37 of the 108 electoral proxy contests
launched outside of the takeover context during the period of 1996-2004
were successful. Hence, an insurgent will have to consider the benefits of
victory in light of the probability of failure. Also relevant is the insurgent’s
ownership percentage of the target corporation. If an insurgent owns 5% of
the target, it will capture only 5% of the increase in firm value resulting
from the successful proxy contest notwithstanding the fact that it will have
incurred and risked 100% of the cost.85 The other 95% of value will be
conferred on the firms’ other shareholders even though they funded none of
the cost of the proxy contest. This “free-rider” problem discourages
shareholders from launching proxy contests. Many shareholders will
instead holdout for the opportunity to free ride on a fellow shareholder’s
proxy contest.86
Interrelated with cost are collective action difficulties inherent in public
corporation shareholder voting.87 In the face of a proxy contest, a rational
shareholder will choose to become informed about an insurgent’s slate only
if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Most shareholders will
conclude that the opportunity cost of reading the insurgent’s proxy
statement exceeds the expected benefit of an informed vote. Therefore,
they will rationally remain uninformed and thus vote for the incumbents by
default.88 Even if a shareholder concludes that the expected benefit of
becoming informed outweighs the cost, he is still unlikely to act because of
a free-rider problem. Realizing that his vote is not likely to be outcome
83

Claims alleging proxy rule violations are considered both derivative and direct. See
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). Hence, the incumbent board will use the
corporate coffers to finance any such litigation. See Bainbridge, supra note --, at 1075.
84
See id.
85
This is obviously an oversimplification—it does not take into account probability of
success, estimation error risk, etc. For a more detailed example, see Bebchuk, supra note --,
at 15-16.
86
See id. See also Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note --, at 512; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra
note --, at 177-78.
87
See CLARK, supra note --, at 390.
88
See id. at 390-91. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1575 (1989); Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note --,
at 512; Bainbridge, supra note --, at 1089; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983).
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determinative, he will choose not to incur the cost of becoming informed.89
Instead he will try to free ride on the efforts of other shareholders and
nonetheless capture the benefits of informed collective action. Of course,
other shareholders are likely to implement the same strategy and likewise
remain uninformed. In such a case, no collective action will be taken and
no benefits will be captured.90
Additionally, even if informed, many shareholders will be reluctant to
vote for the insurgents. They may be suspicious of the insurgent’s
motives,91 uncertain as to whether the corporation will perform better under
the insurgent’s team, or simply subscribe to the axiom “better the devil you
know than the devil you don’t.”92 Incumbents also have an important
psychological advantage in that they solicit proxies under the name of “the
corporation” as opposed to their own names as an insurgent will have to
do.93 Further, some institutional investors may be reluctant to vote against
the incumbents because of business concerns. For example, a vote by an
insurance company against an incumbent board will likely jeopardize any
existing and future business with that corporation and will be poorly
received by incumbents at other companies.94
As a result of the above factors, most shareholders are predisposed to
vote for the incumbents. The insurgents will not necessarily even get the
votes of disgruntled shareholders. These shareholders are more likely to
instead follow the “Wall Street Rule,” i.e., sell their shares prior to the vote.
Doing so eliminates the need to incur information costs or assume risk with
respect to the insurgent.95
89

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --, at 66.
See CLARK, supra note --, at 392-93; Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on
Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. L.J. 95, 99 (2003).
91
“[A] challenge could be motivated by a desire to obtain the private benefits
associated with control. A decision to mount a challenge could be due, not to a belief in
superior management ability, but to the challenger’s adeptness in extracting private
benefits.” Bebchuk, supra note --, at 18.
92
See id. See also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note --, at 177.
93
See EISENBERG, supra note --, at 112.
94
See Pozen, supra note --, at 97; John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of
Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1988); Bebchuk, supra note --, at 20. See also
Gretchen Morgenson, Investors vs. Pfizer: Guess Who Has the Guns?, NEW YORK TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2006, at _ .
95
See Pozen, supra note --, at 96 (“The Wall Street Rule is alive and well. In most
cases when institutional investors are dissatisfied with the performance of a company’s
directors or executives, these investors simply sell the stock. Selling the stock sends a signal
to the company, yet does not impose any costs (other than trading costs) on institutional
investors.”). See also Bainbridge, supra note --, at 1079; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note --, at
90
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At a majority of public companies, an insurgent will also have to deal
with a staggered board.96 With a staggered board, a corporation divides its
directors into groups, typically three, and only one group comes up for
election each year.97 Thus, if a corporation has a three group staggered
board, only one-third of its board seats would come up for election each
year. Therefore, to win a majority of board seats, an insurgent would have
to mount and win two electoral proxy contests in three years. This
obviously increases an insurgent’s costs as it doubles the number of
required solicitations and stretches the insurgent’s campaign over more than
year.98 Additionally, even shareholders who deem the insurgent’s slate
superior to that of the incumbents may be reluctant to vote for the insurgent
because of the required two rounds of elections. Voting in the insurgent’s
slate in round one would put the board in limbo for a year. The incumbents
will retain control but know they are on the way out. They will also have to
deal with the internal division and friction caused by having a third of the
board composed of a competing faction.99
The bottom line is that an insurgent will face an expensive uphill battle
in an electoral proxy contest. It will have to spend heavily to overcome
rational shareholder apathy and other impediments, but based on the data
cited above, its chance of success will be approximately one in three.
Given an insurgent is only reimbursed if it prevails and then has to share the
spoils with all other shareholders, it is likely that many would be insurgents
do nothing or sell out instead of fighting. In this light, it is not surprising
177; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --, at 83. Note that the “Wall Street Rule” may
not be an option for some institutional shareholders. For example, the investment policies of
index funds typically limit the funds’ discretion to sell. Also, entirely unloading a large
position in a corporation is difficult. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure
of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 at *6565.
96
See Bebchuk, supra note --, at 21. Staggered boards are not the only structural
impediment to proxy fights. An even stronger structural impediment is provided by a dual
class capitalization. Approximately six percent of public companies have dual class
capitalizations. See Paul A. Gompers et. al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of DualClass Companies in the United States (2006) at 3.
Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511. Briefly, a company with a dual-class stock capitalization
has two classes of common stock, typically Class A and Class B. Class A shares are
publicly traded and provide one vote per share. Class B shares are not publicly traded, carry
super voting rights (such as ten votes per share), and are mostly owned by management.
Often management owns Class B shares equal to a majority of shareholder voting power. In
such an event a proxy contest would be futile. Management would simply vote its
controlling stake in favor of the incumbents’ slate. See Bainbridge, supra note --, at 1075.
97
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 8.06; See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d).
98
See Bebchuk, supra note --, at 21.
99
See id. at 21-22.

2006]

ANNUAL ELECTIONS AND MEETINGS

19

that so few electoral proxy contests are launched and that even fewer are
successful.
The end result is that in the vast majority of cases the election of
directors is a charade—incumbent victory is a foregone conclusion. Hence,
justifying annual director elections as a check on management is misplaced.
An annual charade simply provides no meaningful check on management.
Characterizing the annual election of directors as a charade is nothing
new,100 and various proposals have been made over the years to make them
more meaningful.101 Among those that have recently been pushed are
allowing shareholders to include nominees in corporations’ proxy
materials,102 requiring corporations to reimburse insurgents’ proxy contest
expenses,103 and implementing a majority voting standard for the election of
directors.104 Certainly director elections would be more meaningful if
shareholders were able to include competing candidates in a corporation’s
proxy materials or corporations were required to reimburse an insurgent’s
expenses as doing either would result in more contested elections. Director
elections would also be more meaningful with a majority voting standard as
shareholders would have the power to block the election of one or more
management nominees without having to launch a proxy fight.105
100

See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note --, at 88:
[C]ontrol will tend to be in the hands of those who select the
[nominating] committee by whom, in turn, the election of directors for
the ensuing period may be made. Since the [nominating] committee is
appointed by existing management, the latter can virtually dictate their
own successors. Where ownership is sufficiently sub-divided, the
management can thus become a self-perpetuating body even though its
share in the ownership is negligible.

See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --, at 87.
101
See CLARK, supra note --, at 95.
102
See Security Holder Director Nominations, 34-48626, 2003 WL 22350515, *1 (Oct.
14, 2003).
103
See Bebchuk, supra note --, at 24-26; Strine, supra note --, at 1778.
104
See The ISS Institute for Corporate Governance, Majority Voting in Director
Elections (2005). Available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/MVwhitepaper.pdf. See also
Gretchen Morgenson, The Shareholder Spring, N.Y.T., Apr. 27, 2006, at B1.
105
Note, however, that because of the so-called “holdover rule,” an incumbent director
that does not receive sufficient votes in an uncontested election to be reelected would not
actually be ousted from the board. This rule, reflected in both the MBCA and Delaware
Code, provides that an incumbent director remains on the board until his successor is elected
and qualified. See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, at § 8.05(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§141(b). Because no successor will have been elected given that the number of nominees
will equal the number of seats up for election, a losing incumbent will remain on the board.
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Consequently, any of these measures would likely strengthen the check on
management provided by annual director elections. Even a strengthened
check, however, does not support the mandatory requirement of annual
director elections. The check, strengthened or otherwise, flows not from
the frequency of director elections but from the possibility that shareholders
could rise up at any given time and oust an incumbent board, if
warranted.106
2. Corporate Democracy
Hoschett notes that annual elections serve as a “mechanisms of
corporate democracy.”107 Likewise, the NYSE Listed Company Manual
describes the purpose of its corporate governance listing standards, among
which is the annual election requirement, “to encourage high standards of
corporate democracy.”108 The phrase “corporate democracy” relates to the
governance structure of a corporation. Shareholders as the residual
claimants to the corporation’s income and assets elect the corporation’s
board of directors which oversees its business and affairs.109 Hence, at least
in theory, a corporation is a representative democracy—shareholders elect
representatives to make decisions in the best interests of the corporation.
Periodic elections are certainly a critical feature of a representative
democracy, but the concept of representative democracy is obviously not
dependent on annual elections, whether through a meeting or otherwise.
One need only consider that in our federal representative democracy no
The same would not be true for a non-incumbent candidate, but several companies who have
adopted majority voting standards avoid the situation by filling board vacancies prior to the
annual meeting, as allowed under the MBCA and Delaware Code, through board action
thereby giving even “new” candidates incumbent status. See Thaddeus C. Kopinski, Will
Investors Choose Majority Vote or Pfizer? (Mar. 3, 2006). Available at
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/03/will_investors_choose_majority.html#more. Some
companies have addressed the holdover rule issue by adopting director resignation policies
that, for example, require a directors who do not receive sufficient votes to be reelected to
submit their resignations to the board. The board will then decide whether to accept the
resignation. See, e.g., the policy of Dell Inc. available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/826083/000095013406001756/d32587exv99w1.ht
m. The ABA Preliminary Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws on Voting by
Shareholders of the Election of Directors includes proposals meant to address the holdover
rule. See Preliminary Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws on Voting by
Shareholders for the Election of Directors, January 17, 2006, at 27-35.
106
See CLARK, supra note --, at 96; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --, at 76.
See also Bebchuk, supra note --, at 23 (“there is no reason to assume that the optimal
frequency of scheduled elections for directors is once a year.”).
107
Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 46.
108
See id. § 301.00.
109
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note --, at 67.
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governmental officials are elected annually. The founding fathers did in
fact debate whether annual elections were appropriate for members of the
House of Representatives but ultimately decided on biennial elections.110
Further, any assertion by the NYSE that annual director elections are
important for corporate democracy is undercut by an exception for foreign
companies. Specifically, non-U.S. companies can obtain a waiver from
compliance with the annual election requirement and other corporate
governance standards that are inconsistent with home country laws or
practices.111 All that is necessary is that the foreign company furnishes the
NYSE a written certification from independent counsel in its home country
that non-compliance with a particular standard is not prohibited by home
country law.112 The primary reason for the exception is global competition
among exchanges for listings.113 It, however, demonstrates a less than full
commitment to corporate democracy by the NYSE.
With that said, voter turnout for the annual elections of directors is
excellent. “U.S. corporations routinely achieve participation at shareholder
meetings in excess of 80% of outstanding shares -- far higher than in any
other country.”114 Such high turnout is surprising, at least at first blush.
Rational shareholder apathy would seem to dictate that many, if not most,
shareholders would not even take the time to fill out and send in their proxy
110

See The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 reported by James Madison:
June 21, 5-9 (Jun. 21, 1787).
111
See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 103.00, Non-U.S. Companies. Nasdaq and
AMEX have similar policies. The SEC release approving listing standard changes at the
NYSE and AMEX to allow these waivers provided as follows:
The AMEX and NYSE have both identified the following areas in which
an exception or waiver from otherwise applicable listing standards might
be provided based on a home country practice: (1) Quarterly reporting of
interim earnings; (2) composition and election of the Board of Directors;
(3) shareholder approval requirements and voting rights; [FN5] and (4)
quorum requirements for shareholder meetings.
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the
Exchanges’ Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52
Fed. Reb. 24,230 (June 23, 1987).
112
See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 103.00, Non-U.S. Companies.
113
See Karmel, supra note --, at 334.
114
See John C. Wilcox, Shareholders Nominations of Corporate Directors--Unintended
Consequences and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS
LAWYERS & LITIGATORS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1486
PLI/corp 1167, 1170 (2005).
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cards. The fact that holders of over 80% of shares do would suggest that
shareholders highly value the annual exercise of corporate democracy
notwithstanding the shortcomings of director elections described above.
This in turn would support the requirement of annual director elections.
Drawing this conclusion from the data, however, would be misguided.
This is because institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies and bank trust departments hold more than 60% of the
voting shares of major U.S. corporations,115 and these shareholders have
several reasons unrelated to the annual exercise of corporate democracy for
voting their shares. First, the portfolios of many institutional investors are
managed by investment advisers subject to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. The Act generally imposes fiduciary obligations on investment
advisers to vote the shares in the portfolios they manage.116 Second,
institutional investors for private sector employee benefit plans are subject
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 which likewise
generally imposes fiduciary obligations on the portfolio managers to vote
their portfolio shares.117 Third, the Investment Company Act of 1940
requires mutual funds and other investment companies to disclose how they
voted their portfolio shares, thereby providing investment companies with a
strong incentive to vote to avoid unfavorable disclosure.118 Fourth, as
mentioned above, many institutional investors have an economic incentive
to vote (and to vote with management).119
Additionally, frequently shares held in street name with brokers are
voted as determined by the broker and not the beneficial owners.120
115

See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation be Imposed on
Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. L.J. 1, 9 (2004).
116
See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 FED. REG. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) (noting
that “[t]he duty of care requires an adviser with proxy voting authority to monitor corporate
events and to vote the proxies.”)
117
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2003) (noting that portfolio managers are required to vote proxies on
items that will affect the value of the plan).
118
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 FED. REG. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003).
119
See supra text accompanying note __.
120
See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, Oct. 2002, at 6. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354820 (noting that 70% to 80% of shares trade on the NYSE in
1997 were owned in street name). “Street name” means that the shares are held of record in
the name of a depository company used by the brokerage house (e.g., Cede & Co.) and not
the name of the beneficial owner. Holding shares in street name is encouraged by brokers
because it reduces formalities associated with transferring shares. See 1 Bloomenthal, supra
note --, at § 17:9. See also Bethel & Gillan, supra note --, at 6 (noting that brokerage firms
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Brokers are required to seek voting instructions from beneficial owners.
With respect to routine matters, including uncontested elections, if a
beneficial owner does not provide instructions at least ten days before the
meeting, the broker is free to, and typically does, vote these “uninstructed
shares” as it chooses.121 Data from the 2005 proxy season indicates that the
voting rights relating to 56% of accounts with shares held in street name
were not exercised by the account holders.122 Presumably, many of these
shares were nonetheless voted by brokers. Typically broker votes of
uninstructed shares represent five to ten percent of votes cast at an annual
shareholders’ meeting.123 Considering the legal obligations and economic
incentives regarding institutional shareholder voting and permitted broker
voting of uninstructed shares, it is unlikely that high voter turnout is
indicative of shareholders placing a high value on the annual exercise of
corporate democracy.
C. Annual Shareholders’ Meeting Requirement
1. Presenting Matters to the Shareholder Body
Hoschett asserts that requiring annual shareholders’ meetings is
justified because they afford shareholders “an opportunity to bring matters
before the shareholder body, as provided by the corporation’s charter and
bylaws.”124 Annual shareholders’ meetings do provide such an opportunity
but not as a result of a corporation’s charter or bylaws. The charters of
most public corporations simply do not address the issue and the bylaws
typically make it more difficult for shareholders to bring forth matters.
Specifically, most public corporations include within their bylaws an
advance notice provision requiring a shareholder to notify the corporation
in writing of a matter she wishes to present at the annual meeting a

routinely charge clients fees if they fail to hold their shares in street name). It is also favored
by many shareholders because it allows them to keep their identities, securities positions,
and votes confidential, even from the Issuers of the shares. See id.
121
See NYSE Rule 452, AMEX Rule 577, and NASD Rule 2260. See also Bethel &
Gillan, supra note --, at 6-7. Note that the NYSE Proxy Working Group has recently
proposed categorizing all director elections as non-routine thereby preventing brokers from
voting uninstructed shares in uncontested director elections.
See Report and
Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange, 21 (June 5,
2006). Available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISED_NYSE_Report_6_5_06.pdf.
122
See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials Release, 2005 WL 3610280 (December
5, 2005) at 31.
123
Bethel & Gillan, supra note --, at 3.
124
Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 45.
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prescribed number of days (typically 45 days) before the meeting.125 If a
shareholder fails to provide the requisite notice, he or she will not be
allowed to present a matter at the meeting. In some sense, however, it is
irrelevant because, as mentioned above, very few shareholders attend
annual meetings. So even if a corporation were properly noticed of a matter
to be presented, there would be little of the “shareholder body” around to
hear the presentation.
The real way to get a matter before the shareholder body is to have it
included in the corporation’s proxy materials. As mentioned above, Rule
14a-8 under the Exchange Act provides shareholders with a mechanism to
do so.126 The rule has been on the books since 1942, has been revised on
numerous occasions, and has always been controversial.127 Commentators
have long asserted that the costs of the rule outweigh its benefits.128 They
complained that the rule was used “chiefly by timeworn gadflies or
religious or political groups unable to achieve their ends through legitimate
political mechanisms.”129 As of 1981, the cost-benefit analysis looked to be
accurate—a lot of money had been spent on including thousands of
shareholder proposals in corporations’ proxy materials but only two of
these proposals passed over management opposition.130 However, with the
rise of institutional activism the rule is now viewed by many as an
important corporate governance tool.131 “Institutional investors have found
Rule 14a-8 useful both in their efforts to affect change directly through the
share voting process and as a bargaining tool in negotiating with
management for governance changes.”132
During the period of 2001 through 2005, 3,099 corporate governance
related shareholder proposals were submitted, and 1,730 were voted on,
many of which received a majority of votes cast.133 Submitted proposals
125
See Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note --, at 511. See also 2 MBCA ANN., supra note -, § 7.07 Official Comment.
126
See SARGENT & HONABOCH, supra note --, at § 5:2 (“Rule 14a-8 permits
shareholders to effectively communicate with their fellow shareholders . . . .”).
127
See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in
Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 882 (1994).
128
See SARGENT & HONABOCH, supra note --, at § 5:2.
129
See Palmiter, supra note --, at 901.
130
See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18
GA. L. REV. 425, 426 (1984).
131
See SARGENT & HONABOCH, supra note --, at § 5:2.
132
See id.
133
See Georgeson Shareholder, 2005 Annual Corporate Governance Review, 10
[hereinafter
Corporate
Governance
Review].
Available
at
http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/2005_corpgov_review.pdf. For example, during
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not voted on were either omitted by the corporations as not proper under
Rule 14a-8 or withdrawn by the proponent. Oftentimes, a proponent agrees
to withdraw a proposal following negotiated concessions by
management.134 Notwithstanding its recent rise, Rule 14a-8 remains
controversial. Management generally views it as too permissive while
many shareholders view it as too restrictive.135 Given the rule’s history--it
has been revised fourteen times since its 1942 promulgation—it is likely
that the SEC will continue to tweak it.136
Because the annual shareholders’ meeting requirement causes public
corporations to solicit proxies annually, it indirectly, as a result of Rule 14a8, affords shareholders an annual opportunity to present matters to the
shareholder body. While this presentation occurs through the corporation’s
proxy materials and not at the meeting itself, many nonetheless view it as
an important component of corporate democracy. While the end result may
support shareholders’ meetings generally, it does not justify the requirement
to hold meetings annually. It is not uncommon for a public corporation to
have years where it has no shareholder proposals included in its proxy
materials.137 And while the number of shareholder proposals submitted and
voted on grew explosively from 2001 to 2003, the year-to-year numbers
dropped in both 2004 and 2005.138 One suspects as memories of Enron,
WorldCom and the like fade and corporations continue to enact reforms
pushed by shareholder activists, the numbers will continue to decline.
2. Deliberation
Hoschett also asserts that “[t]he theory of the annual meeting includes
the idea that a deliberative component of the meeting may occur.”139
Specifically, “at a noticed annual meeting a form of discourse (i.e., oral
reports, questions and answers and in rare instances proxy contests) among

the 2001-2005 period, shareholders submitted 419 proposals to destagger boards or eliminate
poison pills, and 314 or 75% of these proposals received a majority of votes cast. See id. at
2.
134
See id.
135
See SARGENT & HONABOCH, supra note --, at § 5:2.
136
See Palmiter, supra note --, at 882. Additionally, on numerous occasions the SEC
has flip-flopped its position on interpretive issues under the rule. See id.
137
For example, in 1998 (the only year for which I have data) the proxy statements of
537 out of 1,374 included only director election and/or auditor ratification proposals. Bethel
& Gillan, supra note --, at 14.
138
See Corporate Governance Review, supra note --, at 1.
139
683 A.2d at 46.
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investors and between shareholders and managers is possible.”140
Therefore, “[s]hareholders’ meetings are mandated and shareholders
authorized by statute to transact proper business because we assume that at
such meetings something said may matter.”141 The fact of the matter is,
however, little deliberation occurs. As mentioned above, very few
shareholders actually attend the meetings. Further, the board controls all
aspects of the annual meeting. The board sets the location, date, record
date, time, and agenda of the annual meeting, all of which impact
shareholder attendance and thus opportunity for deliberation.142 The board
also appoints the chairperson for the meeting (typically the corporation’s
CEO).143 The chairperson has complete authority to set the order of
business and meeting rules, including admission restrictions and time limits
on speeches from the floor.144 Thus, oral reports or question and answer
session may be brief or omitted entirely.145 “Anyone who has attended an
annual meeting in recent years will tell you that they fall far short of the
promised forum of meaningful communications between board members
and investors.”146
Additionally, public corporations reflect an authority based decision
structure as opposed to a participatory democracy. It would simply be
impractical, if not impossible, to run a public corporation based on
shareholder consensus.147 As a result, the Delaware Code provides that the
corporation’s business and affairs “shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors,”148 and the Model Code has a similar
140

Id.
Id.
142
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211 & 213; 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, §§ 7.01 &
7.07. See also Nordlund, supra note --, at 991. For example, Halliburton was recently
accused of holding its annual shareholders’ meeting in a small Oklahoma town to minimize
attendance by activist shareholders. See Kelly Kurt, Move of Halliburton meeting draws
fire, Assoc. Pres (May 15, 2006).
143
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231 ; 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 7.08(a).
144
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231 ; 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 7.08(b). See also
Nordlund, supra note --, at 989.
145
See Nordlund, supra note --, at 985 (noting that “[s]ome companies have even held
‘no frills’ meetings which deal only with the minimum legal requirements and do not include
any presentations on company performance or products.”).
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The End of the Annual Meeting?, 8 CORP. GOV. ADVISOR 29, 30 (Jul./Aug. 2000).
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See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002).
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). See also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) (“One of the most basic tenets of Delaware
corporate law is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of
the corporation.”); 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 8.01(b) (“All corporate power shall be
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provision.149 Corporate law does recognize the importance of deliberation
among board members in reaching decisions. As the drafters of the Model
Code put it, “[t]he underlying theory is that the consultation and exchange
of views is an integral part of the functioning of the board.”150 However,
there is no similar basis for the assertion that annual shareholders’ meetings
are required in order to provide an opportunity for shareholder deliberation.
This view is reinforced by post-Hoschett changes to the Delaware
Code. In 1997, the Delaware legislature overruled Hoschett by amending
Section 211(b) of the Delaware Code to specifically allow shareholders to
elect directors by written consent in lieu of annual shareholders’
meetings.151 Obviously, if a corporation seeks to elect directors by written
consent, there will be no meeting and thus no opportunity for shareholder
deliberation. In a similar vein, the Delaware legislature amended Section
211(a) of the Delaware Code in 2000 to allow for virtual shareholders’
meetings held in cyberspace.152 The section does require that a corporation
holding a virtual meeting “implement reasonable measures to provide . . .
stockholders a reasonable opportunity to participate in the meeting . . . .”153
In that regard, however, the section specifically requires only that
shareholders have “an opportunity to read or hear the proceedings of the
meeting substantially concurrently with such proceedings . . . .”154 There is
no specific requirement that the technology used for a virtual meeting
afford shareholders an opportunity to communicate with the corporation or
fellow shareholders. At least four other states have similarly amended their
corporate codes in recent years to allow virtual shareholders’ meetings.155
3. Confrontation
Although not appearing in Hoschett, the Delaware Code, the Model
Code, or the exchanges’ listed company materials, some commentators
have asserted that a purpose of the annual meeting is to provide

exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors . . . .”).
149
See 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 8.01(b).
150
See, e.g., 2 MBCA ANN., supra note --, § 8.20, Historical Background.
151
See 71 Del. Laws, c. 120, §§ 12, 13.
152
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(1).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
The four are California, Maryland, Michigan and Oklahoma. See CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 600(a) (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass'ns § 2-503; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1405 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1056 (West 2005).
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shareholders with an opportunity to confront management.156 Annual
meetings certainly do provide shareholders with such an opportunity, and
the possibility of confrontation could perhaps provide an additional check
on management. In particular, members of management may be less
inclined to engage in opportunistic behavior or shirk responsibility knowing
that they may have to explain themselves to shareholders face-to-face and
suffer the attendant embarrassment. It may also allow disgruntled
shareholders to vent frustration. And some shareholders do avail
themselves of the opportunity.157
However, there is no requirement that directors attend annual
shareholders’ meetings (although since 2004 SEC proxy rules have required
corporations to disclose director attendance).158 For example, only a single
director (the Chairman and CEO) attended Home Depot Inc.’s 2006 annual
shareholders’ meeting, and he refused to answer questions as to why the
other directors were not there.159 Additionally, similar to deliberation, the
amendments to the Delaware Code allowing the election of directors by
written consent and virtual shareholders’ meetings indicate that the
Delaware legislature does not view confrontation opportunity as a purpose
of annual shareholders’ meetings. If a corporation elects directors by
written consent in lieu of a meeting or holds a virtual meeting, there is no
opportunity for confrontation.160 Note that other states may take a different
view on this point. The Model Code does not provide for electing directors
by written consent or virtual shareholders’ meetings, although, as noted
above, four states in addition to Delaware allow virtual meetings.161
However, a legislative proposal to amend the Massachusetts corporate code
to allow virtual meetings was withdrawn in the wake of protests that virtual
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See, e.g., Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder Meetings, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 8, *9 (2004); Broc Romanek, Truth on the Market,
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2006/05/16/halliburton-annual-shareholders-meetinglocation/#comment-2215, cmt. 1 (May 17, 2006) (“the purpose of the meeting is to allow
shareholders the opportunity - just once a year - . . . to confront management if they so
choose.”).
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See Scott Hensley & Joann S. Lublin, Pfizer Meeting Gives Dissidents Voice, Not
Votes, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2006, at B1 (describing shareholder confrontations
occurring at Pfizer Inc.’s annual shareholders’ meeting).
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See Schedule A, Item 7(h)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
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See Chad Terhune, Home Depot’s Critics Tear Into Firm’s Practices, Conduct,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2006, at B3.
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See Borso, supra note --, at 18 (noting that Delaware law does not require virtual
meetings “to provide an electronic analogy of confrontation.”).
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meetings provide no opportunity for face-to-face confrontation.162
Regardless, the uproar in Massachusetts was because virtual meetings
would allow management to avoid ever having to face shareholders at a
physical meeting, an entirely different issue than the frequency of meetings.
Hence, confrontation opportunity may justify requiring physical meetings,
notwithstanding Delaware’s view, but it does not justify requiring them
annually.
D. Emergence
The lack of strong justification for requiring director elections and
shareholder meetings annually raises the question of why these
requirements ever emerged. The existing state law requirement of annual
shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors has a long history. Its
origin can be traced back to the twelfth century English trade guilds,163 and
the requirement became the norm in early corporate charters in England and
the United States.164 It was carried over to the first state general
incorporation statutes,165 and from there to the Delaware Code and the
Model Code. Mandatory annual elections and meetings likely made sense
for early corporations given the less pronounced separation of ownership
and control, geographic proximity of shareholders, the absence of voting by
proxy, and primitive communication technology. Specifically, physical
attendance by shareholders at meetings was much more necessary (to vote,
to be informed, etc.) and less burdensome. Thus, shareholder attendance
was likely substantial, and therefore the elections and meetings were much
more meaningful. If owners of a majority of shares were physically present
at a meeting, shareholders could nominate competing director candidates
from the floor, present matters to the shareholder body, and engage in
deliberation with fellow shareholders and management.
As for the exchanges, the NYSE began requiring annual meetings for
the election of directors in 1909, again back in the days when the
requirement likely made sense.166 Although the founding of the AMEX
dates back to 1860,167 the AMEX did not add its requirement until 1973
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after being rebuked by the SEC in the 1960s for lax regulation.168 The
much younger Nasdaq (it was formed in 1971169) added its requirement in
1987 as part of an effort to secure exemptions from state registration
requirements for Nasdaq NMS securities.170
Nasdaq viewed such
exemptions as necessary to successfully compete for listings against the
NYSE and AMEX whose listed shares enjoyed exemptions from state
registration requirements thereby reducing transaction costs for listed
companies.171
Thus, the NYSE requirement emerged when the
justifications were valid, the AMEX requirement resulted from regulatory
pressure, and the Nasdaq requirement was the consequence of competitive
concerns.
E. Conclusion
There simply is no strong justification for requiring director elections
and shareholder meetings annually. Annual elections provide at most a
minimal check on management, a check that is not dependent on the
frequency of elections. Nor are annual elections critical to the exercise of
corporate democracy. Likewise, annual shareholders’ meetings provide
little if any opportunity for shareholder deliberation, and regardless,
shareholder deliberation is not mandated by corporate statute and has been
severely undercut as a justification for annual shareholders’ meetings by
recent changes to the Delaware Code. To be sure, annual shareholders’
meetings do provide an economical mechanism for shareholders to bring
matters before the shareholder body and an opportunity for shareholders to
confront management. But justifying the requirement on these bases alone
seems misplaced considering the continued controversy surrounding Rule
14a-8 and the absence of statutory or case law authority supporting the
confrontation justification.
Further, even if states or regulators were to mandate annual shareholder
votes on, for example, executive compensation, there is no reason why the
vote would need to be done through the mechanism of a meeting. As
168
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discussed above, very few shareholders attend meetings. Consequently, it
is highly unlikely that debate and discussion on an issue will occur at the
meeting and even less likely that if it does occur it will result in an outcome
determinative change in votes. The vote could easily be handled entirely
through mail in proxies or a similar mechanism. While I am not suggesting
that director elections and shareholders’ meetings be entirely abolished—
they do occasionally serve a useful purpose—an optional approach, like the
one adopted by Minnesota as discussed below, would be much more
efficient.
IV. THE MINNESOTA APPROACH
This part explores an alternative approach taken by the State of
Minnesota with respect to director elections and shareholders’ meetings.
Annual director elections and shareholders’ meeting are now optional under
Minnesota corporate law. This part first details Minnesota’s approach and
then considers its benefits and costs. It concludes that the approach is
superior to the current regime.
A. Regular Meetings of Shareholders
Effective January 1984, Minnesota replaced the concept of annual
shareholders’ meetings with “regular” meetings of shareholders.
Specifically, subdivision 1. of Section 302A.431 of the Minnesota Business
Corporation Act (Minnesota Code) provides: “Regular meetings of
shareholders may be held on an annual or other less frequent periodic basis,
but need not be held unless required by the articles or bylaws or by
subdivision 2.”172 Subdivision 2. requires a corporation to hold a regular
meeting if it has not done so for 15 months and a shareholder or
shareholders holding at least three percent of the corporation’s voting stock
submits a written notice of demand to the corporation’s chief executive
officer or chief financial officer.173 The board is then required to call a
regular meeting within 30 days of receipt of the demand to be held no later
than 90 days from receipt of the demand.174 If the board fails to do so, the
shareholders making the demand may themselves call and provide notice of
a regular meeting, and the corporation is required to reimburse expenses
they incur in connection therewith.175
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Subdivision 4. of Section 302A.431 provides that “[a]t each regular
meeting of shareholders there shall be an election of qualified successors
for directors who serve for an indefinite term or whose terms have expired
or are due to expire within six months after the date of the meeting.”176
Thus, not only has Minnesota eliminated its requirement to hold an annual
meeting, it has also eliminated its requirement to elect directors annually.
As the General Comment to the section states, “this statute now provides
that the presumptive term of directors is indefinite and is no longer one
year.”177 As a result, “a corporation could conceivably exist for years
without calling an official shareholders meeting.”178
B. Benefits
In adopting the regular meeting approach, Minnesota recognized that
“[t]here is no reason for the shareholders of the corporation to be required
by state law to meet once each year,”179 certainly a position consistent with
my conclusion in Part III. In explaining the approach, it noted that
eliminating the annual meeting requirement “streamline[s] the corporate
entity and reduce[es] unnecessary formalities.”180 The approach has several
benefits in addition to reducing formalities.
First, it potentially saves corporations money and time. In connection
with an annual shareholders’ meeting, “[c]ompanies frequently spend
thousands of dollars to rent hotel ballrooms; more thousands to provide
security, transportation and communications; more thousands for lawyers,
accountants and p.r. people; and still more thousands for coffee, donuts and
176

See id. § 302A.431, Subd. 4.
Id. Gen. Cmt.
178
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‘goodie bags.’”181 For larger corporations, these costs run into the seven
figures.182
Perhaps more costly is the time consumed by senior
management (especially considering the astronomical compensation paid
by many public corporations) in preparing for the annual shareholders’
meeting, time that could likely be better spent.183 “Days and days are used
up in planning, in rehearsals, in preparing lists of possible questions and
answers, in drafting speeches, and in arranging logistics. All this is time not
spent in thinking about the business, solving its problems and addressing its
future.”184 Additionally, many companies spend tens of thousands of
dollars each year merely determining whether to include Rule 14a-8
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials.185 Under the Minnesota
approach, money and time would be saved in years where no shareholder
demands a regular meeting and therefore no meeting is held. Shareholders,
in fact, would have an incentive not to demand a meeting unless they
anticipate it being meaningful because the costs of meetings are ultimately
borne by them as the residual claimants on the corporation’s income and
assets.
Second, the Minnesota approach is flexible. It does not provide for a
one size fits all rule like the prevailing system. Instead, it starts with the
default rule of no requirement to hold a shareholders’ meeting and elect
directors annually but allows a corporation (or its shareholders) to opt-in to
an annual meeting requirement through an appropriate articles of
incorporation or bylaws provision.186 This flexibility is consistent with the
general principle “that corporate law should function as a sort of standard
form contract, an ‘off the rack’ set of terms that parties may use for their
convenience but may also freely alter.”187 Such an approach allows parties
to customize terms to best fit their particular situation.188 One could
certainly debate whether the better approach would be to set annual director
elections and shareholders’ meetings as the default rule and allow
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corporations to opt-out.189 Given the lack of strong justification for the
annual election and meeting requirement, however, I believe Minnesota has
taken the right approach.
The Minnesota approach also provides flexibility to shareholders. Even
if a corporation has not opted for something other than the default rule, an
owner of 3% or more of the corporation’s shares can nevertheless require a
corporation to hold a shareholders’ meeting to elect directors as often as
every 18 months by submitting the requisite demand to the corporation’s
CEO or CFO.190 Additionally, shareholders owning less than 3% are not
totally excluded from this option. They are free to form a group of
shareholders that own in the aggregate 3% or more and submit a valid
demand.191 At one time, federal proxy rules may have essentially negated
this option with respect to a public corporation, but the rules were relaxed
in 1992 to enable a wider range of communication among shareholders
without triggering filing and other requirements under the federal proxy
rules.192
Third, the approach may actually result in more frequent deliberation
between management and shareholders. Recall that given the sparse
attendance at annual meetings and managements’ control over the agenda,
etc., there really is little if any deliberative component. Under the
Minnesota approach, a shareholder could use a shareholders’ meeting
demand as leverage to get a private audience with management to discuss
issues of particular concern to the shareholder. This currently occurs in the
Rule 14a-8 context. Many shareholder proposals have opened pre-meeting
discussions and negotiations between management and the proponent that
led to management concessions in exchange for the proponent withdrawing
the proposal.193 Using a meeting demand as leverage would likely be more
effective from a shareholder’s perspective. The corporation will have more
at stake if it cannot convince the shareholder to withdraw the demand—it
would have to hold a shareholders’ meeting. In the Rule 14a-8 context, the
corporation has to hold a meeting regardless, so it is faced with the less
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weighty choice of capitulating or including the proposal in the corporation’s
proxy materials.
C. Costs
The Minnesota approach does have some costs. First, no longer will
shareholders be guaranteed an annual opportunity for deliberation,
confrontation and presenting matters to the shareholder body. Granted,
shareholders are always free to demand a meeting, but even if they do so at
every opportunity, the statute only guarantees a regular shareholders’
meeting every 18 months. This timing issue could result in delaying or
extending an electoral proxy contest by six months or more. Further,
smaller shareholders will face the added complication of having to form a
group to meet the requisite 3% ownership requirement for making a
demand if the corporation is otherwise not required to hold a meeting.194
Second, many corporations routinely include auditor ratification on the
annual meeting agenda. Specifically, they have shareholders vote on the
ratification of the outside auditing firm selected by the corporation’s audit
committee to audit the corporation’s financial statements for the coming
year. Auditor ratification by shareholders is not required by state or federal
law or exchange listing standards.195 Nonetheless, it persists today and is
occasionally the subject of shareholder proposals at companies that do not
do it.196 Obviously, in years that a corporation does not hold a regular
meeting, shareholders will not have the opportunity to ratify the selection of
the corporation’s auditor or to vote on any other matters.
Third, as mentioned above, the Minnesota approach is flexible because
it takes an enabling as opposed to mandatory approach with respect to the
timing of shareholders’ meetings and director elections. This touches on a
broader debate in corporate law as to what types of rules, if any, should be
mandatory, a debate that is discussed at length elsewhere and beyond the
scope of this article.197 With that said, there are advantages to mandatory
194
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rules in some contexts, and therefore corporate law contains a number of
mandatory rules notwithstanding lost flexibility.198 These advantages
include investor protection against misinformation, elimination of
uncertainty, and shareholder protection against opportunistic charter
amendments.199 Keep in mind, however, that the Minnesota approach is not
a pure enabling rule. It sets a floor with respect to the timing of
shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors but allows corporations
to adopt a stricter rule. Contrast that to a pure enabling rule such as
Delaware Code Section 212 which specifies the default rule of one share,
one vote but allows a corporation to freely raise, lower or eliminate the
voting rights of shares through a certificate of incorporation provision.200
Thus, the Minnesota approach does not raise the same concerns as a pure
enabling rule that would allow a corporation to completely opt-out from
holding director elections or shareholders’ meetings.
D. Conclusion
The beauty of the Minnesota approach is that it generally preserves the
substance of all the justifications for annual director elections and
shareholders’ meetings discussed above while having the potential to
eliminate the holding of meaningless elections and meetings. If an
insurgent wants to take a run at ousting a board, it can demand a meeting a
do so. The check on management provided by director elections is fully
preserved because, as noted above, the check does not come from the
frequency of director elections but from the possibility that shareholders
could rise up at any given time and oust an incumbent board.201 Likewise, a
shareholder can demand a shareholders’ meeting if he or she believes
deliberation or confrontation with management in such a setting is
warranted, feels it is necessary to present a matter to the shareholder body,
or has some other reason. Absent a reason, however, no demand will be
made and therefore the holding of meaningless elections and meetings will
be avoided.
At the same time, a corporation is always free to hold a regular
shareholders’ meetings even if not required to do so. For example, a
corporation may view the meetings as an important part of investor or other
198
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stakeholder relations. The point is that the Minnesota approach leaves the
choice to a corporation and its shareholders instead of dictating a one size
fits all rule that results in many, many meaningless elections and meetings
and therefore the unnecessary waste of corporate resources. It is in the best
interests of management and shareholders to avoid the time and expense of
meaningless elections and meetings. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel have noted, “[b]ecause voting is expensive, the participants in the
venture will arrange to conserve on its use.”202 The same could also be said
about annual shareholders’ meetings. The Minnesota approach allows for
such conservation and at the same time preserves the benefits of annual
director elections and shareholders’ meetings with few costs. Therefore, it
is superior to the current scheme.
V. ABOLITION OF EXCHANGES’ LISTING STANDARD
As mentioned above, my solution is to abolish each of the exchanges’
listing standard that requires corporations to hold annual director elections
and shareholders’ meetings. This would give effect to the Minnesota
approach and allow the “laboratory” of state corporate law to experiment
with alternative rules.203 While the Minnesota approach is more efficient
than the current scheme, exposing the issue to corporate federalism may
yield an even better outcome. This part provides a brief overview of
corporate federalism. It then considers the implications of applying the
concept to the frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings.
Finally, it speculates as to why the listing standards requiring annual
director elections and shareholders’ meetings have persisted.
A. Overview of Corporate Federalism
The basic idea of corporate federalism is that competition among states
for corporate charters leads to the production of corporate codes that
generally maximize shareholder value.204 Briefly, managers are free to
incorporate a business in any state, regardless of where the firm’s
operations are located. Hence, they will choose the jurisdiction that
maximizes the joint welfare of management and investors since this will
result in the lowest cost of capital.205 Because incorporations generate
202
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revenues for the state and work for local attorneys, states compete with
each other in attracting incorporations and will therefore generally seek to
produce corporate codes that maximize shareholder value.206 Not knowing
what in fact is the best mix of corporate law provisions, states experiment
with different rules and the market determines the winner.207 Over time the
“losing” states adopt similar rules in response and the preferred solution
eventually predominates.208 The end result is typically policy innovation
and better rules.209
This is not the case, however, when it comes to rules concerning the
frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings for public
corporations. Because of the overriding exchange rules, there is little
motivation for states to experiment in the area.210 While there is ostensibly
regulatory competition among the three exchanges, they cannot truly
compete on listing standards--any changes to their standards must be
approved by a single regulator, the SEC.211 And the SEC has historically
pushed for uniform standards among the exchanges, when appropriate.212
Moreover, the exchanges, similar to the states, have little motivation to
compete on the frequency of elections and meetings given the overlapping
state rules.
Further, competition among three as opposed to fifty jurisdictions is
less likely to generate experimentation yielding optimal rules.213 Thus, it is
not surprising that competition among the exchanges has yielded a uniform
but relatively baseless rule. Conversely, experimentation has occurred
among the states with respect to private corporations for whom exchange
listing standards have no application. For example, Model Code § 7.32, a
provision that has been adopted in some form by 20 states, allows a private
corporation, among other things, to completely opt-out of director elections
206
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and shareholders meetings.214 Additionally, experimentation has also
occurred among states competing for investment company incorporations.
For example, Maryland’s corporate code requires annual shareholders’
meetings for the election of directors but specifically allows an investment
company to opt-out of the requirement through an articles of incorporation
or bylaws provision.215
B. Implications of Corporate Federalism
By abolishing exchange listing standards that require corporations to
hold annual director elections and shareholders’ meetings, the number of
“jurisdictions” potentially experimenting with different approaches to the
issue for public corporations will increase from three to fifty, thereby
greatly increasing the likelihood of yielding a more efficient rule. While
the Minnesota approach is superior to the current rule, it may not be
optimal. It includes a number of variables that could be tweaked by other
states, including the minimum share ownership percentage requirement
(3%) and the elapsed time requirement (15 months) for a shareholder to
demand a meeting.216 North Dakota, in fact, takes the same approach as
Minnesota but has a five percent minimum share ownership requirement
and a slightly different elapsed time requirement (“the earlier of six months
after the fiscal year end of the corporation or fifteen months after its last
meeting”).217 Other states may want to experiment with an all together
different approach, perhaps divorcing the concepts of director elections and
shareholders’ meetings or lengthening the time between elections but
eliminating staggered boards.
Flexibility on the frequency of elections and meetings is important in
light of the continuing corporate governance reform debate. As Chancellor
Allen recognized in Hoschett, director elections and shareholders meetings
play a central role in corporate governance.218 Consequently, the best rule
should not be viewed in isolation but instead as part of an overall corporate
governance package. As Leo Strine, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of
Chancery recently put it:
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State law determinations about corporate elections are not
made in a vacuum but as part of an overall consideration of
how to shape a working system of corporate law that
promotes responsible wealth creation. In that deliberative
process, policymakers have to balance the social utility of
empowering centralized management against the need for
protective mechanisms that ensure managers’ fidelity to the
entities they govern. That balance informs the policy
debate about what transactions stockholders should have
the right to veto, how easy it should be to bring a derivative
suit, when a board should be able to block a takeover, and
most every important question of corporate law.219
As mentioned above, various corporate governance reform proposals
have been made recently to make the election of directors more meaningful.
These include variations on shareholder proxy access, majority voting, and
proxy contest expense reimbursement. In connection with adopting one of
these proposals, a state may determine it is no longer advisable to elect
directors annually. For example, a criticism leveled against many of the
proposed reforms is that they will lead to short-termism.220 Specifically, if
directors face meaningful annual elections, management will focus on
short-term results to the detriment of the corporation’s long-term success.
This is because the majority of shares of most public corporations are
owned by institutional investors who generally focus on short-term
performance. Therefore, the thinking goes, to keep this shareholder base
happy, management will likewise adopt a short-term focus to the detriment
of the corporation’s long-term success.221 Additionally, management will
also likely spend even more money and time than under the current system
in preparing for an annual meeting with meaningful elections because it
will have to actively campaign for the incumbents and against the
challengers. Hence, if a state were to experiment with one or more of the
proposed reforms, one way to address these concerns would be to lengthen
the time between director elections thereby decreasing their frequency.222
Under the current system, this would not be possible because of the
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overriding exchange listing standard requirement of annual director
elections and shareholders’ meetings.
C. Persistence of Exchanges’ Requirement
The history outlined in Part III.D. helps explain why the requirement of
annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors emerged but
does little to explain why it persists today at the exchange level. The
persistence is somewhat surprising considering the purported primary
justifications lack validity, state law addresses the area, and a better
approach is available. The persistence is likely explained at least in part by
public choice theory. The exchanges serve three primary interest groups:
listed companies, investors and the SEC. None of these groups have a
strong incentive to push for the elimination of the requirement to hold
annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. For listed
companies and the SEC, this is due in large part to the public misperception
that annual elections and meetings are critical to corporate democracy and
good governance. Thus, for listed companies the costs of holding annual
elections and meetings are not great enough to push for change and risk
being labeled as anti-democratic or anti-shareholder. For the SEC, pushing
for what would be perceived as a reduction in shareholders’ rights would be
inconsistent with its mission of protecting investors. As for investors, many
are likely rationally apathetic as to exchange rules and those who are not,
i.e., activist shareholders, highly value the annual opportunity to push their
agendas through shareholders’ meetings.
Similarly, the exchanges are likely hesitant to unilaterally propose
changing the status quo even if the change would benefit both listed
companies and investors generally. Softening the annual election and
meeting requirement would raise the ire of vocal shareholder activists and
would be framed as inconsistent with “encourage[ing] high standards of
corporate democracy” and maintaining “appropriate standards of corporate
responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders,”223 the stated
purpose of the NYSE corporate governance standards. Additionally, the
NYSE and Nasdaq are now explicitly competing on the basis of stringent
listing standards. For example, Nasdaq recently announced it is creating a
new market tier “that will have the highest initial listing standards in the
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world.” Softening the annual election and meeting requirements would
likely be perceived as inconsistent with such a statement.224
Further, some may believe that ceding the issue of frequency of
elections and shareholders’ meetings to the states is ill advised. This is
because the idea touches on a 30 year old debate as to whether competition
among states for incorporations has led to a race to the top or a race to the
bottom in state corporate law.225 The debate is beyond the scope of this
article, but it has produced some thinking that is relevant here. Specifically,
Professor Bebchuk has asserted that corporate federalism “works well in
some areas of corporate law but poorly in others; that is state competition
produces a race for the top with respect to some corporate issues but a race
to the bottom with respect to others.”226 Among the areas he asserts it does
not work well are rules with respect to proxy contests.227 A proxy contest is
often a necessary component of a hostile takeover attempt because of the
widespread use of poison pills. Hence, rules that make proxy contests more
difficult make hostile takeover attempts more difficult and thereby dilute
the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control. Since managers
are averse to being ousted, they will seek rules that make it more difficult to
launch proxy fights even if these rules decrease shareholder value.228 In an
effort to get incorporation business, states may respond by providing rules
making proxy contests more difficult.
State rules with respect to the frequency of director elections clearly
impact the timing of electoral proxy fights. If for example a state required
elections only once every five years, it would be possible to launch an
electoral proxy fight only once every five years. Hence, to address this
concern, the exchanges could set a minimum standard for the frequency of
elections.229 For example, they could mandate that every listed company
make it possible for an insurgent holding a specified percentage of stock to
launch an electoral proxy contest to replace a majority of the board at least
224
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once every two years.230 This could generally be done through a bylaw
amendment entitling a shareholder owning the requisite percentage to call a
special meeting for the purpose of removing the incumbent board and
electing a new board.231 It should also allay any race to the bottom
concerns and still allow ample room for state experimentation. Now if only
there was an easy way to deal with the public choice theory considerations.
D. Conclusion
Whether states would actually experiment with different approaches to
the frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings if the
exchange requirements were abolished is unclear. Recent research has
characterized competition among states for incorporations as weak, largely
because Delaware has established itself as the runaway winner of the
race.232 Hence, many states likely view competing as pointless.233
Delaware and other states may wait to see, for example, whether high
visibility corporations incorporated in Minnesota (e.g., Best Buy Co., Inc.;
Medtronic, Inc.; UnitedHealth Group Incorporated) take advantage of the
available flexibility and, if so, how it is received by the marketplace. In
fact, exchange abolishment may in and of itself aid market acceptance of a
Minnesota-type or other approach by signaling to the market that, in the
view of the exchanges, innovation is desirable.234
In any case, weak competition among states is better than no
competition, especially considering the current suboptimal scheme. At a
minimum, abolishing the exchange requirements will give effect to the
superior Minnesota and North Dakota approaches for corporations
230
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incorporated in those states, but it may also lead to experimentation by
other states and thus a better rule. At the same time, race to the bottom
concerns could be addressed by an exchange listing standard floor.
Regardless, the resulting flexibility may prove an important component of a
corporate governance reform package.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporations have been required to hold annual shareholders’ meetings
for the election of directors since the dawn of corporate law. The
requirement is reflected both in state corporate law and exchange listing
standards. Although this requirement may have made sense at one time, it
no longer does. Today, the large majority of annual director elections and
shareholders’ meetings are meaningless and therefore a waste of time and
money.
One response could be to make them more meaningful. For example,
shareholders could be allowed to annually include candidates on a
corporation’s proxy, management attendance at shareholders’ meetings
could be mandated; a convenient meeting location could be required, etc.
But for what end? There simply is no need for shareholders to annually
elect directors, exercise corporate democracy, engage in deliberation,
present matters to other shareholders, or confront management. It is not the
frequency of these events that is important but the possibility that they can
be triggered when needed. The Minnesota approach eliminates the annual
requirement but preserves the trigger—no shareholders’ meeting for the
election of directors is held unless shareholders or the corporation deems it
necessary.
With that said, I am a believer in corporate federalism, even if
competition among states for incorporations is weak. Hence, this article
does not call for a blanket adoption of the Minnesota approach but instead
proposes that the exchanges abolish their requirements to hold annual
shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. This would not only
give effect to the Minnesota and North Dakota approaches, but would
provide states with a meaningful opportunity to experiment with different
rules. And flexibility on the frequency of elections and meetings could be
an important part of corporate governance reform.

